An application of cost risk in incentive contracts. by McGrath, Christopher Michael
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1985



















Thesis Advisor Willis R. Greer Jr.
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited,
T226634

T v CLASSIFICATION OF TuflS PAGE
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
POP^" SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 1b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
CUF'iTV CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY
CLASSIFICATION /DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
3 DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF REPORT
Approved for public release,
distribution unlimited.
FORiVnNG ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)





7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School
DRESS (Cry, State, and ZIP Code)
iterey, California 93943-5000
7b ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, California 93943-5000




9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER









LE (Include Security Classification)














18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
Cost Estimates, Incentive Contracts,













on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
er begins with an examination of the literature concerning
ntract effectiveness and contractor motivation. Citing
quently supported conclusions, the researcher integrates
cost risk analysis methodology based upon the Beta
The result is a share curve that automatically adjusts
tio based upon estimated cost variance.
rcher suggests that this approach is better at reflecting
an the standard linear design. The share curve provides
aring, especially at higher levels of cost variance,
both significant rewards and penalties only for signi-
tions from target cost. The final conclusion is that
TRI3UTION /AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT
NCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED D SAME AS RPT. D DTIC USERS
21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
iME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL
lis R. Greer Jr




RM 1473, 84 MAR 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted
All other editions are obsolete
1
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CI ASSIFlC AT ION OF THIS PAGE (Whan Dmm Bn««r«4)
the share curve mitigates the defense contractors' "risk
averse" nature, thus allowing the profit motive to become
operative in incentivizing the contractor to control or
reduce costs.
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
An Application of Cost Risk in Incentive Contracts
by
Christopher Michael McGrath
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.A., Cornell University, 1976
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of





This paper begins with an examination of the literature
concerning incentive contract effectiveness and contractor
motivation. Citing the most frequently supported conclusions, the
researcher integrates these with a cost risk analysis methodology
based upon the Beta distribution. The result is a share curve
that automatically adjusts the share ratio based upon estimated
cost variance.
The researcher suggests that this approach is better at
reflecting cost risk than the standard linear design. The share
curve provides more risk sharing, especially at higher levels of
cost variance, and provides both significant rewards and
penalties only for significant deviations from target cost. The
final conclusion is that the share curve mitigates the defense
contractors' "risk averse" nature, thus allowing the profit
motive to become operative in incentivizing the contractor to
control or reduce costs.
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INTRODUCTION
A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
The use of incentives in DOD contracting is not a recent
development. Incentive type contracts were used in the
construction of the ironclad Monitor during the Civil War, and in
the development of early aircraft by the Wright brothers in 1908.
Used extensively during World Wars I and II, incentive contract-
ing had its heyday during the 1960s under then Defense Secretary
McNamara. With the advent of this interest however, a signifi-
cant research effort begin to focus on the effectiveness of
incentive arrangements. Many studies indicated that there
existed no statistical relationship between cost outcome and the
incentive applied (i.e., the sharing ratio). Those researchers
who did find some tendency towards cost efficiency conceded that
the effect was weak.
Included in many research conclusions though, was observa-
tions by many in the field that the fault lay not in the concept
of the incentive contract itself, but in poor application,
inappropriate incentives, and overall poor structure.
Related studies in contractor motivation revealed many
factors impacting contractor performance that were largely
ignored within the incentive contract as motivators. Items such
as company survival, growth, product quality, and cashflow, among
others, were seen to be just as important as profit. The
importance of understanding the tradeoffs that contractors were
making between these extracontractual goals was often lost in the
construction of the incentive itself. Many became doubtful that
effective cost incentives were possible utilizing sharing
formulas, as the emphasis was on the profit motive alone.
Other research looked at the cost risk in defense contract-
ing, how to estimate it, and its impact on the contracting
process. Defense contractors were characterized as a "risk
averse" group, consistently trading lower profits in the long run
for cost protection in the short run. In the attempt to maintain
a steady flow of government business, the quality of the product
was seen to be key. Thus cost as well as schedule became second-
ary contractual concerns.
When attempting to apply all of these relevant findings to an
effective incentive design, one can justifiably conclude that
there is no consensus on any "best ways" to structure cost
incentives, but a strong one for doubting their efficacy.
This researcher believes however, that the bulk of the work
done on incentive contracting has concentrated too much on the
aggregate performance of the contracts studied, and thus has
failed to identify those factors that make for a successful
application of cost incentives. Factors such as the state of the
economy and the DOD budget, the size of the contract and the
contractor, the type of product, stage of development, and risk,
have yet to be factored out and separately studied as to how they
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effected final outcome. The lack of this approach has resulted
in a general dismissal of the incentive contract as an effective
motivator of cost efficiency.
This researcher feels that structuring a good incentive
arrangement is a difficult proposition, perhaps the most
challenging of the contract types. To do it properly requires an
eyes open approach that recognizes each situation as unique.
The applicability of the incentive tool should be continually
questioned, given the effect of some of the aforementioned factors
on the arrangement. Even when a successful incentive arrangement
is pointed out, many researchers will contend that it is because
of inflated target costs, or due to intense government
management. This researcher believes however, that if the
patterns of past success are studied, certain combinations of
factors would dictate certain applications of risk in the
incentive structure. Particular applications under specific
situations would tend towards effective motivation of cost
efficiency and successful outcome.
The objective of this study is to take an in depth look at
the existing work in this area, and attempt to develop a new
approach to structuring the incentive arrangement. The focus
will be on the share ratio, with an eye to applying certain
important environmental factors, as well as integrating more risk
sharing in the design process. This will involve a broader
application of environmental factors in the choice of the
11
incentive tool, and the use of a nonlinear sharing function
about target cost to better spread risk.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is, "Do the present methods of
structuring cost incentives, based on linear share functions,
adequately consider cost risk, and effectively motivate
contractors towards cost efficiency."
Subsidiary research questions considered are:
(1) What factors need to be considered when applying risk in
the design of incentive contracts?
(2) Can these factors be quantified in any systematic manner?
(3) How can appropriate risk factors optimally be applied in
the incentive arrangement to effectively motivate contractors to
cost efficiency?
(4) Is there a better method in establishing a sharing ratio
than the linear approach?
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
The scope of this study is restricted to cost incentives,
applying research based primarily on DOD incentive contracts.
The focus will be on integrating research findings on incentive
contract effectiveness and contractor motivation with cost risk
analysis techniques, resulting in a new method of structuring
cost incentives.
The study will be limited by the fact that data on target
costs to actual contract outcomes is difficult to collect for
proper independent analysis. The researcher will depend on the
methods and analyses of previous researchers in the field,
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identifying and ignoring those whose rigor and methodology were
questionable. This approach will provide the base to build from.
This study is based upon the assumption that the majority of
DOD and industry contractors are honest members of their
profession, who actively seek contractual performance that will
fulfill the standard of providing a good product on time, and at
a fair and reasonable price. This win/win approach necessarily
views the defense contract as a risk sharing instrument to some
degree, and those in the field not subscribing to this approach




The methodology used for this study involved a rigorous
literature search in the areas of incentive contracting,
contractor motivation, and cost risk analysis. Viewpoints thus
developed were further refined by attendance at two professional
workshops, one in Risk Management (National Contract Management
Association Spring Symposium, Golden Gate Chapter - May 1985), and
the second in Advanced Concepts in Cost Estimating (Technical
Marketing Society of America workshop - July 1985). The study of
the literature base compiled, plus the interaction with both
government and industry professionals during the workshop and
symposiums provided the basis for the findings and conclusions.
13
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT
The report has five chapters. Chapter I is the introduction
to the study. Chapter II deals with the research results in
incentive contracting effectiveness, as well as contractor
motivation. The significant common findings and their possible
interrelationships are also explored as a basis for the risk
analysis concepts discussed in Chapter III. There the important
aspects of risk in defense contracting are discussed alongside
the important research findings to* consider in assessing risk and
structuring an incentive contract. Chapter IV will integrate
these three main areas of concern: research findings, risk
analysis, and cost incentive design; and present an alternative
sharing arrangement that this researcher feels would be more
effective in incentivizing cost efficiency. The final Chapter V
will present a summary with general conclusions.
14
II. INCENTIVE CONTRACTING AND CONTRACTOR MOTIVATION
A. RESEARCH FINDINGS
In 1980, Dr. John Kennedy of Notre Dame conducted a three
year study entitled "Incentive Contracts and Cost Growth" for the
Air Force Business Research Management Center. [Ref. 1] It was
a massive effort consisting of:
(1) a complete literature review and documentation in the areas
of incentive contract effectiveness and contractor motivation.
(2) interviews with key government and industry personnel.
(3) a series of small conferences and workshops with industry
and government personnel.
(4) a pilot study of two representative companies in which
actual incentive contracts were tracked to assess their effects
within the company structure.
The literature review provided evidence for fourteen hypo-
theses that were further validated in the other phases of the
study.
The intention of the researcher is to review these hypo-
theses, their related findings, and conclusions that are relevant
to the framework being developed in this study. At that point, a
few finer points from separate pieces of research examined by the
larger study will be highlighted to round out the base from which
to build and proceed to the topic of cost risk analysis.
Each hypothesis will be stated, with the relevant findings
and conclusions following in summary format.
15
B. THE HYPOTHESES
1. "Contract type is not the determining variable in contract
outcome." [Ref. 1: p. 15]
There were indications that some correlations could exist
between contract type and how company managed a program, with a
concurrent but moderate effect on company behavior. In only about
50% of the studies was a strong correlation found between contract
type and actual contractor performance. The conclusion is that
contract type is not the determining variable in contractor
performance. Extra contractual factors such as company survival,
growth, market share, cash flow, future business, and avoiding
the risk of loss, play as important if not more important a role
in determining contract outcome. Contractors considered the
contract as a definition of parameters such as delivery,
specifications, and program requirements, within which the
contractor had to work. In regards to actual expenditures
however, the contract was seen as establishing only an upper
dollar limit, not a firm target. In summary, though specific
contract type can influence behavior, it must be adapted to the
company, the requirements of the contract itself, and consider
extra contractual factors and their related effects.
2. "Most incentive contracts end up near target." [Ref. 1:
p. 37]
After adjusting for changes, most all incentive contracts end
up within a cost envelope of 7% of target (plus or minus). Some
correlation exists between share ratio and cost outcome in that
higher share ratios did tend to restrict overruns, especially if
16
the share was steeper than 70-30. CPIF contracts tended to
overrun more than FPIF. The tendency for contractors to spend to
target was noted, as well as attempts to negotiate both contract
design and target to protect themselves against possible losses.
Cost targets for incentive contracts appear to be higher than
other contract types. Defense contractors are characterized as
risk averse, meaning that they will opt for lower profits in
exchange for cost protection. The general conclusion is that the
present system drives the incentive contract to target. It is
unlikely that significant cost savings can be generated in the
short run. Contractors avoid large underruns as much as large
overruns, and may be willing to incur extra costs if necessary to
keep contract outcome within the cost envelope. Overruns were
viewed by the contractors as acceptable as long as they did not
break ceiling.
3. "Target costs of incentive contracts are higher than the
target costs of CPFF contracts." [Ref. 1: p. 45]
Many studies that Kennedy reviewed supported the conclusion
that the targets of incentive contracts are higher than other
types. The targets of FPI contracts appear higher than CPIF. In
the 1960s, incentive contract underruns were due to inflated
targets, whereas in the 1970s, increases in program definition
and competition for scarcer defense dollars produced tighter
targets and subsequent overruns. The general conclusion is that
competition, tight funding, and good program definition can often
drive the target down too low and result in overruns.
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4. "The most significant factor in determining target cost for
negotiation is where the company expects to end up." [Ref. 1:
p. 52]
This effect varies with the economy and financial health of
the firm. In the long run, the defense firm attempts to maintain
an adequate profit (approximately 4 — 8 % ) [Refs. 2,3], increase its
technology base, maintain good reputation, secure follow on
business, and avoid the risk of loss. Therefore, the target
negotiated will depend on such factors as the economy, DOD
budgetary situation, excess capacity of the firm, and chances for
follow on business, to name a few.
5. "The government's administration of the contract destroys
any opportunity for the incentive to work." [Ref. 1: p. 69]
The higher the level of competition, the more likely that an
incentive contract will overrun due to buying in, overoptimistic
targets, or the attractiveness of the program in regards to
technological development or follow on business. Government
involvement blurs responsibility for poor contract outcome.
Kennedy concludes that the administration of government procure-
ment and policy is both cumbersome and counterproductive, in some
cases - destructive.
6. "The cost of administering an incentive may outweigh any
savings that might be achieved through the incentive
arrangement." [Ref, 1: p. 78]
The administration costs of an incentive contract is exces-
sive, and is a function of the complexity of the incentive(s).
If an incentive is to work properly, it must be simple and have a
minimum amount of administration applied to it.
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7. "Many contractual arrangements are designed for intentional
overruns." [Ref. 1: p. 86]
Buying-in, overoptimistic targets costs, or planning for
slight overruns are common when competition is tight, funding is
constrained, or the program has changes of generating a signifi-
cant level of future business. Multiple incentives can protect a
company from loss by allowing a negotiated structure that opti-
mizes expenditures, since successful contracts are considered as
those ending up below ceiling. Contractors will negotiate the
contract to minimize their risk of loss, and contract structure
is paramount to achieving this end. For example, a contractor
can negotiate a tight target cost, a high target profit, and a low
sharing rate, with an aim towards foregoing a few percentage
points of profit to cover the probable overrun that will occur.
The most important goal is to avoid losses while clearing a
satisfactory profit level in the long run.
8. "Many incentive contracts are inappropriately structured."
[Ref. 1: p. 108]
In general, there is a lack of situational tailoring in
incentive contract design. The common practice is simply to pull
from the book and apply with rules of thumb. Extra contractual
factors are key, but usually ignored. The upper limits set on
profit make it more attractive to incur costs not reduce them. A
competitive environment results in risky target costs, and makes
cost savings unlikely. Fee ranges have been too narrow, and
risks have outweighed gains. Slopes of incentive share lines
have been too shallow. Many government contracting and
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acquisition people do not understand incentive structures or the
implication of the combinations of ranges, fees, and share
ratios. Often, too many elements are incentivized in the same
contract. Rarely is there a clear relationship between the goals
of the customer and the incentive structure.
9. "Penalties are better motivators than rewards." [Ref. 1:
p. 120]
By structuring incentives correctly, a contractor can be
motivated to reduce or control costs. The more likely that a
contract will overrun, the more effective penalties will be.
Nevertheless, if the intent of the incentive contract is to
harness the profit motive as a positive incentive, then penalties
are inconsistent with the framework. Penalties are already
present in risk. For example, an FPI contract has both the
greatest profit incentive and also the greatest penalty, if it is
significantly overrun. Penalties if applied are much more
appropriate for cost type contracts.
10. "The more complex the incentive arrangement, the more
likely it will be ignored." [Ref. 1: p. 131]
Incentives must be simple to be effective. Many companies do
not even implement simple incentives, much less worry about
complicated ones. Relationships between parameters should be
straightforward and target cost should be attainable. In
summary, incentive contracts are difficult to construct and
manage, especially in a competitive environment. The major
attraction of incentive contracts, as they have generally been
designed, to defense companies are the hidden "give away" aspects
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that the government negotiators miss, or the minimizing of risk
through negotiation of advantageous incentive parameters.
11. "The most important element in the incentive is
performance." [Ref. 1: p. 143]
Performance incentives are not needed since companies will
always achieve performance goals. Contractors will slip cost
first, then schedule, but rarely performance. The motivation to
maintain a flow of government business through good product
reputation makes performance incentives unnecessary.
12. "Incentives have to have organizational visibility to
work." [Ref. 1: p. 1-145]
Though results are inconsistent, the research shows that some
degree of visibility is a must. However, the practice is rarely
seen. The larger, more important programs are more likely to
result in incentives flowing down through the contractor's
organization. Most companies concentrate on their project
budget, and let the incentives take care of themselves. As the
major function of cost incentives is to discourage cost overruns,
outcomes within the cost envelope (i.e., within ceiling) are seen
as acceptable and therefore managed in the aggregate.
13. "CPIF contracts are fundamentally the same as CPFF." [Ref.
1: p. 1-178]
CPIF contracts are not significantly more effective in
controlling costs than CPFF. Though CPIF arrangements exhibit
better communication between the government and the contractor,
as well as better program definition, both CPFF and CPIF exhibit
high targets. CPIF contracts encourage the contractor to expend
21
dollars and shift overhead and personnel charges among contracts.
Since CPIF contracts provide significant risk protection, it
encourages buying in. Unless very carefully structured and
administered, the CPIF contract becomes the same as a CPFF type.
14. "Cost type contracts result in inefficient high cost
producers." [Ref. 1: p. 1-192]
The general conclusion reached in many studies is that cost
contracts do not lead to cost efficiency. High quality may be
there, but at exorbitant cost. Incentive type cost contracts do
seem to foster better program definition, management, and
communication, but at no savings to the government.
C. THE PILOT STUDIES
The pilot studies of two corporations [Ref. 1: p. II—4-1 3
]
provided continued validation of the previous findings. The
important points of emphasis were:
1. The incentive contract must be structured with the
organization in mind, especially the accounting and financial
management systems. There is no sense in applying an incentive
if the company is incapable of managing it.
2. The incentive arrangement succeeds or fails at the
negotiation table.
3. Changes in general ruin the structure of an incentive
contract. As the number of changes increase with the length of
performance, the less effective are the incentives originally
applied
.
D. MAJOR FINDINGS OF SINGLE STUDIES
The Kennedy study gives a nutshell encapsulation of the
important common findings in the incentive contracting
literature. This base of knowledge can be further refined
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however, with the addition of a few specific findings in the
studies reviewed that are also important to the incentive design.
Dixon [Ref. 4] did a statistical study of NAVAIR FPI
contracts in the 1 9^4 9 — 65 timeframe and discovered some
interesting relationships.
Deviations from target cost had an overall mean of -1.3 with
a standard deviation of 9.1. This indicated that the NAVAIR FPI
contracts, on the average, underran their targets by a little
over 1%, with 68% (1 standard deviation to either side of the
mean) falling in a range of 10.4% under target to 7.8% over
target
.
The deviations from target varied directly with the length of
performance at 1.5% per year, supporting earlier conclusions that
contracts of longer duration have greater chances of overrunning
their targets.
Targets deviations also varied directly with profit at 1% per
percentage increase over 9%. This tends to support the
conclusion that high negotiated profits on incentive contracts
indicate expected overruns by the contractor.
Another direct variation was noted between target deviations
and ceiling price, at a rate of .4 per percentage increase over
123.2. This again supports earlier conclusions that, along with
high negotiated profits, high negotiated price ceilings also
indicate expected overruns.
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Finally, target deviations varied indirectly with the number
of contracts signed within a given year about the mean of 17 with
a standard deviation of 8. The conclusion here was that the
relationship represented a level of competition, indicating that
the more or less intense the competition (i.e., outside the range
of 9-26 contracts) the more significant the deviations from
target
.
These findings are not surprising. The relationships
observed bear out the fact that contractors negotiate high profit
to tight targets to cover planned overruns, and high ceilings to
protect against loss when overruns are probable. Tight targets
are negotiated when competition is intense or funding is tight,
loose targets when competition and funding are less of a factor.
Scherer [Ref. 5] noted much of this back in 1964 when he
characterized the competitive tight targets as "competitive
optimism." He also noted that if a large number of contractors
are bidding on a system, there is a lower probability of success,
and therefore not as much money or effort is put into the
proposal, rendering it less accurate in estimating costs. He
also noted that there is a proclivity to "buy in" on
developmental programs, since any losses that may occur can be
made up on the follow on production contract. Scherer also noted
that CPIF contracts are not much better than CPFF contracts, as
they typically overrun by 1 5—20%. With FPI contracts, there was
a near normal distribution of over/under runs, with an average
underrun of 2.25% and a standard deviation of 10%. These are
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virtually the same findings that Dixon came up with. Additionally,
the data studied yielded a range of 77.75—1 1 7.75% of target for
all incentive contracts with a confidence interval of 95%. This
is important to note, as typical ceiling prices tend to fall in
the range of 120-125%, slightly higher than the upper bound of
actual outcomes observed.
Scherer also noted that the greater the bias toward underrun,
the higher the contractor share, whereas the weaker the underrun
bias, the higher the price ceiling. The general conclusion is
that when uncertainty is great, low sharing proportions are the
rule
.
One very interesting item of note across the board in
incentive contract studies is that the bulk of the sharing
proportions studied are between 0-30%. Proportionately few
incentive arrangements exist in the data base that are steeper
than that. Though the bulk of the research concludes that
incentive contracts as a whole are ineffective, perhaps the
underlying reason may be 'that sharing ratios have been too
shallow.
As further proof along these lines, Fisher [Ref. 6], in his
reappraisal of incentive contracts, discovered that those few
higher share ratios (over 30%) that he studied showed a marked
decrease in target overruns as compared to the less steep share
functions. (Table 2-1) Parker [Ref. 7] additionally noted that
those share ratios greater than 30% did not generally result in
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TABLE 2-1
MEAN OVER/UNDER RUN AND STANDARD DEV
AS A PERCENTAGE OF FINAL COST
ITEM
SHARING RATE VALUE




1.45 -3.5 -2.32 -0.39
STANDARD
DEV 12.95 13.86 3.45 8.81
NUMBER | 43i 144 156 87
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higher profits than the less steep arrangements. Steeper share
ratios may be one solution to the problem of making incentive
contracts more effective.
One final significant study to mention is that of Jones [Ref.
8] on the differing degrees of commodity risk (Table 2-2) and
their effect on incentive contract performance. He noted that
different commodities in the defense market had different degrees
of cost risk associated with them, differing amounts of changes,
and different performance results to target. He also noted that
the distribution, similar to Scherer's findings, were nearly
normal, though not symmetrical about the mean, with a slight
tendency to underrun. (Fig. 2-1) High risk groups had patterns
that underran targets, low risk groups tended to overrun their
targets .
E. SUMMARY
From the significant amount of literature reviewed in the
area of incentive contracts and contractor motivation, some broad
conclusions can be stated with reasonable assurance. One is that
contractors as a group are more concerned with avoiding losses
than making high profits, and see product quality as their
primary contractual goal. Secondly, government application of
cost incentives have been ineffective due to lack of integration
with the contract, the contractor, and the environmental
variables impacting the arrangement, thus rendering the incentive
contract impotent as a tool to control costs.
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TABLE 2-2
AVERAGE COST GROWTH AS A PERCENTAGE OF
COST GROWTH BY COMMODITY CLASS
NBR OF AVERAGE AVERAGE
CATAGORY CONTRACTS CONTRACT MODS OVER/UNDERRUN
AIRCRAFT 19 28.82% 22. 11%
AIRCRAFT
ENG I NES 1 1 654.30% 1 .82%
MISSLES 200 161 .58% -1 .89%
COMBAT
VEHICLES 65 296.58% 2.67%
NON- COMBAT
VEHICLES 26 49.36% -.48%
WEAPONS 32 91.80% 5 . 98%
AMMUN I T I ON 118 53.41% 2 . 38%
ELECTRONICS 193 120.81% 13. 10%
SERVICES 9 139. 14% 10.41%
CONSTRUCTION 41 299.94% 10.17%







i ! i -r-r
i but i on of I noent i ve Cont racts
Jones Study
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Some of the more important facts to consider when designing
an incentive arrangement are such items as:
- Final costs generally fall within 7—10% of target.
- Contractors look for approximately 4-8% profit in the long
run .
- CPI contracts are little better than CPFF.
- Ceiling prices over 123%, and target profits over 9% indicate
expected overruns by the contractor.
- Share rates greater than 30% appear to discourage cost
growth
.
The more important environmental factors to consider are:
- level of competition
- budgetary constraints
- state of the economy
- financial health of the contractor
- length of performance
- number of probable changes (maturity of system)
- commodity type
- financial/managerial system of contractor
Armed with these facts, the question is how to apply them in
designing the effective incentive contract.
The first step is to consider the environmental variables and
their probable impact on the behavior of the contractor, as well
as the possibility that an incentive contract may not be
applicable to the situation. For instance, if the level of
competition is high, the economy in recession, the contractor is
tight financially, and has a lot of excess capacity, a FFP
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contract may be better to apply, as the likelihood of determining
reasonable target costs are very slim. For another example, if
the item being contracted for is in the high commodity risk
group, and is a less mature system with a significant amount of
changes likely under a long period of performance, an incentive
contract again may not be applicable.
From the literature, some of the factors that appear to favor
the application of incentive contracts are:
- a low to medium level of competition
- a more mature system with few expected changes (i.e., low
commodity risk)
- a contractor who understands and can manage incentive
structures
- good contractor financial health
- a reasonable level of free, but not excess, capacity
After making a determination of whether or not to apply an
incentive arrangement, along with a consideration of the
environmental factors and their probable impact on the
arrangement, the design of the incentive structure itself is
addressed. This is the most complicated process, for it is here
that the negotiation position and strategy are formed, and upon
which the success of the incentive rests.
Here, the validity of the target cost is crucial. Though
statistically the final cost is likely to fall within 7-10% of
the target, the target cost is supposed to represent the "expected
cost," that cost which has equal probability of being either over
or under run. Before any development of the incentive structure
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begins, the cost elements of the contractor proposal must be
studied carefully, and a cost risk analysis done to determine the
most probable range where the target should fall. Within this
range, the target cost must be established by integrating the
relevant environmental factors previously discussed with their
probable effects upon contractor behavior and motivation. This
outcome must be further refined by a cost risk analysis, to
arrive at a design which has the best chance of success.
Available cost risk analysis techniques and their benefits are
the subject of the following chapter.
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III. COST RISK ANALYSIS
A. ANATOMY OF COST OVERRUNS
As the success of the cost incentive is usually based upon
the final cost outcome, it is useful to discuss the nature of cost
overruns prior to broaching the subject to risk.
In a recent Touche-Ross seminar [Ref. 9] on cost overruns in
government contracting, held in San Francisco, CA in July 1985,
the primary blame for cost overruns was attributed to poor cost
estimating and management. Such items as inflation, inadequate
specifications, out of scope work, delays, and changes, though
important, were viewed as having a lesser impact overall.
Under the topic of cost estimating, the following six major
areas were noted as problems:
1
.
General lack of understanding the request for proposal
(RFP) . This occurred either through the delivery of an
inadequate RFP by the government, general lack of
experience, or just plain carelessness.
2. Failure to properly apply historical data . This was due to
poor estimating techniques, actual lack of data, obsolete
data, using inappropriate data, or too rapid a preparation
of the data and the estimate.
3. Overoptimistic estimates . Due to a general "can do"
attitude, competitive pressure, desires to gain market
share or break in to new technology, and a hope for
recovery of any loss through follow on business or cost
cutting later on.
4. Poor review of proposal by both the customer and the
preparer . This was due to lack of objectivity, lack of




5. Decentralized estimating . This often caused marginal
instead of bottoms up costing, defective pricing,
overoptimism, and lack of personal involvement of
individual providing the costs with the final product.
6. Poor estimating team . Often the team was composed of
accountants only, or comprised of those with a general lack
of cost estimating skills. At times, no cost estimating
team existed at all. Lastly, in those cases where a team
operated as an established structured group, there was too
much ego involvement by the various cost providers in their
particular area.
In the area of management, the major problem areas addressed
were :
1. Poor production control . Material was often not available,
labor was not ready, and planning was disorganized.
2. Excess costs . Material costs were higher than predicted,
often due to poor subcontracting and purchasing. Wrong scrap
factors were used. Poor labor assignment and lack of proper
training was evident. In some cases, insufficient labor was a
problem. Lastly, high rework rates and a lack of under-
standing the application of the learning curve also
contributed to problems in this area.
3. N_o chain of responsibility . In some cases, there was no
program manager, resulting in poor budgeting and reporting of
costs. Lack of foresight and timely problem solutions were
also two major contributing factors in this area.
The minor areas mentioned (i.e., inflation, bad specifica-
tions, delays, etc.) were seen singly as items that were most
often planned for as contingencies, and therefore were not
critical
.
In the attempt to avoid cost overruns, three stages of a
project were focused on:
1 . The proposal stage
2. The performance stage
3. Cost cutting
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As the latter two stages deal mostly with management of the
project post contract design and acceptance by both parties, they
will not be specifically addressed here. However, the cost
proposal stage is germane to the thrust of this report, and is the
critical stage in overrun avoidance.
At the outset, a good estimating team of qualified personnel
in each major area of work, who are familiar with standard
estimating techniques, is a must. Secondly, any unclear points in
the RFP must be fully clarified. Thirdly, members of the team
must play the devil's advocate and continually address the "what
ifs" in setting the probable cost estimates. Solutions for the
possible problems that could arise must be planned for, and all
assumptions defined and stated clearly with their attendant cost
impact. The final numbers should be challenged by management and
defended by team members. Last, but not least, different
contract forms must be considered along with their impact on cost
and bid contingencies, and one type chosen for a negotiating
base
.
This then provides an overall view from industry of the cost
overrun situation and cost estimating as it relates to bid
proposal. The emphasis on overrun avoidance is clearly set in the
estimating and proposal stage. Work done properly here directly
reduces chances of overrunning the contract. Cost estimation
however, is not a pure science. It requires quite a bit of art
in its application. It is only as accurate as the data applied,
the technique used, the quality of the assumptions and the
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measures of uncertainty and risk as determined by the estimator
and proposal manager. The latter factor especially can make the
difference between a successful estimate and proposal or an
unsuccessful one, even with good data and technique.
What should be the expected accuracy of a good proposal
estimate? Mr. Nathaniel Roosin, Chief Bid and Proposal Manager
for Raytheon Corporation, who lectures extensively on cost
estimating techniques, stated that it is difficult to compare
actual costs with original proposal estimates and judge
performance. [Ref. 10] At best, you attempt to adjust for
changes that occurred over the life of the contract, and then try
to arrive at a ballpark judgement on the quality of the estimate
overall. As a rough yardstick, Mr. Roosin states that a good
estimating team should be able to estimate actual costs within
10% over the long run across contracts. The researcher was left
with an implication that this was an accuracy goal commonly sought
in the industry.
Two important perspectives should be gleaned from this
discussion. One is that government contracting personnel must be
just as meticulous in the areas of cost estimation, RFP prepara-
tion, and proposal review as industry, and two, the common causal
factors in the cost overrun situation should be kept in mind when
reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of a proposal. Both sides
must do their jobs properly to make the contract work. The
necessity for understanding this process, and the reasonable cost
accuracy that can be hoped for, and planned on, cannot be
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understated. An approach to deal with cost estimation review and
how to relate it with contract design is the next subject for
discussion
.
B. A TECHNIQUE FOR COST-RISK ANALYSIS
By definition, target cost is that cost which has an equal
probability (.5) of being either over or under run. [Ref. 11]
The determination of target is therefore dependent upon risk.
When speaking of risk in contracting, the three principle elements
commonly referred to are: technical risk, schedule risk, and
cost risk. Though the major element of interest here is cost
risk, it must be emphasized that cost risk is not independent
from the other two factors. The degree of possible interaction
between the three should always be considered when assessing any
one element.
To be more specific, the risk in each element can be defined
as those random and uncontrollable factors, interacting with
incomplete and uncertain knowledge, affecting the probability
that an element in question will equal a predicted value. Risk
is often illustrated by a probability distribution curve where,
for example, cost would be on the y axis with associated
probabilities from to 100 appearing on the x axis. The
expected cost is therefore that cost on the distribution which
has the highest probability of occurrence (i.e., the modal value).
The cost value that splits the distribution evenly is the median
(50% of the curve to either side), and the average value is the
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mean. In a normal distribution, the mean, median, and mode are
all equal. In non-normal distributions, the target cost, by its
definition, would be the median value. The variability of
probable cost values is also important in determining contract
structure, as the more variable a cost element, the higher the
risk that it will be greater or less than the expected value.
For cost risk, total cost can be broken down into component
parts such as labor, material, and overhead. Those parts can
also be further subdivided into areas of engineering and
production. In major systems acquisition, cost is broken down
into work packages in a work breakdown structure (WBS) network,
so that costs can be separately estimated, and then aggregated
into a total. This is called the engineering or "bottoms up"
approach to cost estimating. In theory, the further one can break
down that total cost into individually analyzable units, the more
accurate the estimate will be. The level of breakdown desired
depends on two principle factors: the level of randomness of the
item cost, and its effect upon total cost.
For example, many costs can be considered as nonrandom, such
as those negotiated in a forward pricing rate agreement
(principally overhead). Particular wage rates can also be
nonrandom, though hours assigned may not. Additionally, some
routine and recurring labor charges can be considered as
nonrandom. As far as effect upon total cost, some highly variable
elements may have significant impact upon the total cost, whereas
others have very little. Suffice to say, the estimating effort
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should focus on those costs exhibiting the greatest degree of
variability with the greater impact on total cost.
Depending upon the time available for analysis, cutoff points
can be established for those costs that will be analyzed in
depth. For example, cost elements that exhibit variability
enough to impact total cost less than 1-2% may be factored out to
allow more time for the greater cost concerns. The appropriate
cutoff point must be determined by the analyst.
An important concept to keep in mind though is that there are
substantially more small risk items in a contract proposal than
large ones. To ignore the small ones safely, they must be
independent from one another. If any relationships exist, the sum
total of their effects could add up to a major concern. When
aggregating many independent elements however, small elements
tend to cancel each other out statistically. Naturally this
situation increases the need for complete and unbiased cost
figures. In discussing this matter, Anderson [Ref. 12] notes
that defense contractors as a group have often failed to
make allowance for such items as rework and program planning
in their proposal. It is therefore incumbent on the proposal
reviewer to ensure not only that the costs are unbiased, but that
all relevant cost elements are addressed.
Once the selected cost elements are established, ranges of
possible cost swings must be determined to arrive at the
probability distribution of possible costs about the expected
value. A well performed bottoms up approach is critical in
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reducing the variability of the total cost, and providing a firm
foundation upon which to determine final contract structure. If
a contractor has faith in his estimating organization, and has
worked the proposal well, then his base cost should have some
stated accuracy, or range of uncertainty. As discussed
previously, management would like to have the base accurate to
within 10% of future adjusted actuals. However, this is totally
dependent upon the variability of the separate cost elements
involved. Management will therefore add contingency dollars to
those areas where risk exposure is the greatest, taking care not
to add too much, resulting in a non-competitive bid. Neverthe-
less, the reviewer does not know where the contingencies are in
the cost proposal, and it is precisely this information that is
most needed to design an incentive related to risk and cost. One
would logically expect that most cost contingencies will fall in
those elements that have the greater variability, and thus the
higher risk.
One simple analysis that can be performed to define the
probable range and variability of cost is the utilization of the
Beta distribution technique often applied in Pert and Pert cost
networks. Though a fully developed Pert Cost network from the
WBS would be ideal, it is too complicated and time consuming a
process to do routinely in proposal validation; however, the
method is sufficiently flexible to adapt to a more general cost
risk analysis.
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For this analysis, a technique used by George Worm, PhD, of
Clemson. University [Ref. 13] is used by the researcher as a tool
upon which to base the development of the incentive structure
discussed later in this report. Three figures are needed in this
analysis :
1. a low cost value representing the best possible achievable
cost under the most favorable of circumstances (.01 - .10
probability)
2. the most likely cost - the value used as the target cost
( . 5 probability)
3. a high cost value representing the highest possible cost
given that most everything that can go wrong will.
(.90 - .99 probability)
In Figure 3-1, a generalized Beta distribution is shown that
is reflective of the research findings of cost outcomes to target
for incentive contracts. Immediately one can see a problem with
the construction as proposed so far. The most likely cost is
a modal value, that falls on the underrun side of the distribu-
tion. The mean, as well as the median, fall at other different
points along the curve. Which point should be chosen as the
target cost? By definition, the median would be the choice as it
is the cost that has the equal probability of being over or under
run, having equal distribution of outcomes to either side.
Intuitively of course, this would not make sense, as use of
the median would produce continual underruns. The solution to
this problem will be discussed later, after further development




















































The determination of the above values should be based upon
reasonable data and the judgement of both contractor cost
estimators as well as government estimators in each cost area.
Data focused on should include a fully worked and clarified
contractor proposal complete with independent government
estimates and cost audit analyses, past track record of estimates
from the same company, and estimating trends in the industry for
the same or similar products. The latter point is extremely
important for, as Jones [Ref. 14] discovered, different
commodities have differing cost and risk characteristics that
should be considered in contract design in regards to the
variability of the target cost negotiated.
All data should be analyzed from the standpoint of how tight
the probable range to the estimated cost is. For example, has
the contractor estimated costs well in the past, and has he a
good data base from which to estimate this particular product?
How has the industry as a whole done in estimating costs for the
product in question? How wide is the cost contention between
government and contractor cost estimates? If the company has
good past data on the product, has estimated well in the past,
industry estimating accuracy for the product has been acceptable,
and the cost contention is minimal, then validation of the
estimate is fairly straightforward. However, if many of the
above factors are not so favorable, than a more rigorous analysis
must be done to determine the probable target and its vari-
ability. Just how to break down the total cost for separate
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analysis is a matter of judgement and time availabiilty. The
target cost goal is one that most closely represents a .5 prob-
ability with some stated variability.
Technical experts as well as financial and accounting experts
are needed in each broad area to establish cost ranges.
Judgements of cost ranges need to be objective and reasonably
backed up by the source queried. If an expert has a bias for or
against a particular cost item or project, this will tend to bias
the judgement. Of the acceptable values given by reasonable
experts in each area, the maximum, minimum, and the most likely
costs are established for a statistical manipulation in
determining target and range.
The mechanics of the mathematical analysis described here are
fairly straightforward, and can be performed on a calculator. A
computer program to accomplish the analysis though, has been
written by Dr. George Worm. The program was originally written
in Fortran, however the researcher has translated it into BASIC
and included the listing as well as the worksheets in Appendix A.
A sample run on a set of representative data is included for
illustrative purposes.
Before concentrating on the technique itself though, it is
necessary to address the statistical foundation upon which it is
based, specifically the applicability of the Beta distribution
and its associated manipulation of data.
The Beta distribution [Ref. 15] is a class of continuous
distributions where the probability of a given event is treated
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as a random variable. The Beta has two parameters, r - the
number of times an event occurs, and N - the total number of
observations. The random variable p has the range of -1. The
distributions that result given various values of r and N take on
an infinite variety of shapes. The most common Beta distribu-
tions illustrated are:
r = N/2 symmetrical curve
r < N/2 positive skew from normal
r > N/2 negative skew from normal
For the purpose here, if sample results are available, but p
is not known, the Beta is very useful in estimating the distribu-
tion of p given r events observed in N trails. Especially when
estimating in a diffuse state, i.e., where there is either very
little prior information, or when the present sample information
overwhelms prior knowledge, the Beta becomes one of the few
methods that yields consistent results of acceptable accuracy.
[Ref. 16]
For instance, Hays and Winkler [Ref. 17] describe the
scenario of a person trying to determine the distribution of the
weight of a potato handed to them. Given the size and shape of
the potato in hand, and having some prior experience with
potatoes, a person could derive a fairly accurate estimation of
the probability distribution of weights for the potato. However,
a person knows that the possible range of weight variability for
potatoes in general is extremely wide, therefore the sample in
hand tends to overwhelm any reliance upon prior knowledge, and
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the distribution can best be described by a lowest possible
weight, a highest possible weight, and a most likely weight or
fairly tight range of likely weights in between.
When dealing with contract estimates, the situation is much
the same. The contract in hand is a sample from all contracts
whose cost outcomes have wide variability. The particular
contract in question however has certain characteristics, type of
commodity, contractor, dollar value, etc. that overwhelm prior
information to the degree that the distribution of final cost is
tight relative to the total N distribution. A reasonable
distribution of probable cost can therefore be derived using the
same method of determining the lowest, highest, and most likely
cost
.
The two values of the most interest in the Beta analysis are
the mean and the variance of the cost distribution based upon the
above three values. The figures to apply are those rigorously
defined in the data gathering and proposal validation process for
each cost element.
The formulae used to approximate the Beta values are:
Expected Value = (L + 4ML + H)/6
Variance = ((H - L)/6)~2
where
:
L = lowest possible value
ML = most likely value
H = highest possible value
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These calculations are performed for each element analyzed.
The totals, including overhead and G & A burdens relative to the
possible ranges, are summed for each separate element to derive
the most likely values and variances. When aggregated in total,
the result is a most likely total cost figure, with an associated
variance range. Though this will be discussed further in Chapter
IV, interested readers should review Ref. 13 for a more in depth
discussion of this approach.
This technique for cost risk analysis is simple, effective,
and not overly time consuming as compared to other methodologies,
including exact calculation of the Beta values. Yet it can
provide a foundation for developing a good incentive design based
on risk. Three points must be kept in mind however:
1. As with any statistical methodology, bad data will yield
poor results. Care must be taken to insure that data used
in validating the proposal as well as the proposal data
itself, are accurate, complete, and applicable.
2. Contractor inefficiencies in performance or cost control
are not expressely considered in this technique. As
envisioned by Dr. Worm, it is to consider uncertain
environmental factors only, with reasonable expectations of
contractor responsibility. He recommends that any doubts
as to contractor performance in this area should be
addressed in the weighted guidelines, and not in added
costs to allow for the possibility within the technique
itself. However, the researcher feels that is a signifi-
cant history of data reveals certain propensities in one
direction or another for either a contractor, or a partic-
ular commodity, then there should be no reason why they
should not be part of the relevant cost ranges. The final
decision must be left to the analyst, and his tolerance for
wider cost ranges by inclusion of these factors.
3. Lastly, the crucial point of independence between cost
elements can not be understated. If several cost elements
are dominated by another element or factor, the sum of the
maximum cost estimate of each related element may be better
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than the final risk analysis cost as determined by the Beta
method. Aggregation of related costs into one element is
perhaps the best approach for dependent costs where feasible,
C. SUMMARY
The researcher has now presented the common characteristics
of incentive contracts as revealed by the research literature,
and has discussed the concept of risk as it applies to the
element of cost. Using the information presented up to this
point, it is now time to illustrate how to integrate this broad
framework into the design of the incentive contract, with an eye
towards refining its application, and improving its effectiveness.
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IV. COST INCENTIVE DESIGN
A. TRADITIONAL APPLICATION OF THE COST INCENTIVE
The common types of incentive contracts used for cost control
are: fixed price incentive (FPI), cost plus incentive (CPI), and
award fee (CPAF, FPAF). In the latter case, the structure of the
contract does not use a fixed incentive or sharing arrangement,
and therefore is not germane to this report. As previously
discussed in Chapter II, research strongly supports the
conclusion that CPI contracts do no better at controlling costs
than their fixed fee (CPFF) counterparts, and thus the researcher
will ignor their application as well. This then leaves the FPI
contract design as the one representative structure acceptable to
use as the example to contrast with the research approach to
follow.
In reviewing briefly the basic design and structure of the
FPIF contract [Ref. 18], it is helpful to view the incentive as
being applied to a set level of performance and schedule values
that remain constant in the contract. This is opposed to a
multiple incentive design, where many contract parameters can
vary and be incentivized
.
The overall incentive design requires that cost, technical,
and schedule risk be reasonably identified, and that the share
ratio be consistent with the degree of uncertainty present. Thus
the major concerns of the contract designer, as noted in Chapter
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Ill, are the definition of the areas of uncertainty, the relevant
cost range, and the associated probabilities of occurrence. This
requires both good program definition as well as good cost
estimates, based upon adequate performance and design specifica-
tions. These estimates must be validated before selecting the
probable target cost to be negotiated. Actual cost can reason-
ably be expected to deviate from whatever target is finally
negotiated. Thus the design of the cost incentive must deal
primarily with the variance of the total cost, and provide for a
sharing function that covers the most probable range where the
final cost will fall. This range of probable cost outcome of
which the sharing incentive is applied is called the range of
incentive effectiveness (RIE). Through this range is applied a
linear sharing function of the type y=mx + b. The actual
function can be expressed as:
Profit = .X(Target Cost - Actual Code) + Target Profit
where X is the contractor's share percentage
The general design can be depicted graphically as in Figure
4-1, where a typical 80/20 cost incentive share line is shown.
The value of X in our profit formula in this case is 20. The
government's share value is the numerator of the share ratio, and
the denominator the contractor's. In simple terms the incentive
displayed provides the contractor with 20% more profit, or 20
cents on the dollar, for every dollar saved under the cost
target. The same factor applies as a reduction to target profit







100 COST CEILING PRICE
Fig. 4-1 Typical FPIF Design
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coin, the government shares 80%, or 80 cents on the dollar, for
costs saved, and incurs extra cost at the same rate for any costs
incurred over the target.
The other points to address in Figure 4-1 are the PTA (point
of total assumption), the ceiling price, and the RIE (range of
incentive effectiveness) which was mentioned previously. The PTA
is the maximum point in the RIE where sharing ceases and the
contractor absorbs 100% of any further costs incurred. The share
line continues beyond this point however at essentially a 0/100
share slope until it reaches zero on the profit axis. This point
is referred to as the ceiling price, and is the maximum total
dollars that the government will pay the contractor. Costs
incurred beyond this point represent a loss. The other end of the
share line extends to zero on the cost axis, which is the low
point of the RIE. Even though the lowest probable cost is far
above that point, based on good estimates of cost and variance,
profit ceilings are generally not established, thereby maximizing
motivation at that end of the cost range.
Share ratios can take on many different values in negotiation
depending upon how the cost variance, and the reasonableness of
the targets (cost and profit), are perceived by both sides. As
mentioned in the research reviewed in Chapter II however, most
share ratios historically have fallen at and above the 70/30
level. One finds very few arrangements below that, for example
50/50, though more recent observations would indicate a movement
in that direction.
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Additionally, the share ratio need not be regular throughout
the RIE, but can change linearly at certain points as shown in
Figure 4-2. Here, there is a relatively flat slope about the
target, with a steeper share line being applied below the target
than above the target. This particular arrangement comes the
closest in intent to the researcher's approach in applying
incentive sharing functions.
The primary reasons why one would want to apply such an
arrangement are not immediately obvious. There is a small range
of cost deviation around the target which is completely
unpredictable even with the best estimates. Why then should we
reward or penalize the contractor to any significant degree within
this area? As mentioned in Chapter III, industry cost estimators
strive for an estimate that they feel is accurate within 10% (plus
or minus). This, for example may be an area best left relatively
flat in the incentive design. Furthermore, since we want to
provide strong motivation for cost control, the incentive share
is greater for costs under target. To reduce the contractors risk
of loss, a less steep sharing ratio is applied to the overrun
side of target. Although this makes good intuitive sense, in
practice it can be very cumbersome and extremely difficult to
negotiate
.
However, the fact remains that when setting share rates, the
variance of the cost target as well as the probabilities of those
variances occurring, must be assessed to establish a proper RIE,













Fiq. A-2 FPIF with Broken Share Line
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the contractor to control costs yet not impact negatively on the
technical performance, schedule, or the effectiveness of the
incentive itself. In other words, cost must not be overemphasized
at the expense of the other contract objectives.
These guidelines are the prime reason why incentive contracts
require the characteristics mentioned in Chapter II, particularly
relatively stable design, with fewer expected changes than
the norm. This stability is part of good program definition
leading to reliable cost estimates to work from. Lacking this,
it is impossible to realistically set proper targets and share
ratios that will be relatively free from contractor gaming during
the negotiation process, which often renders the resulting
incentive impotent. If the contractor is hungry for business,
facing stiff competition in his market, and has a lot of excess
capacity, the problem will be even harder to avoid. Target cost
in his proposal may already be too low to effectively
incentivize. This again, harkens back to Chapter II in its
discussion about understanding the environment that the contract
is being negotiated in. This understanding guides the choice of
proper contract type, and the design of a proper incentive, if
that avenue is chosen.
Upon completion of the research on the contractor, the
commodity, the overall contractual environment, and the validity
of the cost estimates, the RIE, cost/profit targets, and the share
ratio need to be determined. The question remaining is how best
can cost risk be applied in the overall design? We have seen how
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the mechanics of the basic linear share function works in the FPI
contract, now the research approach can be described for
comparison
.
B. THE RESEARCH APPROACH
The design of the cost incentive should reflect the cost risk
inherent in the contract. Risk however, changes as time and
conditions surrounding the contract change. The linear share
function reflects a constant risk condition across the probable
cost range of RIE, except in cases where the share line slope
changes at various points as discussed previously. Though this
latter approach has some merit, it is difficult to design due to
the lack of a well supported methodology to arrive at the proper
shift points. This adds additional burdens to the regular task
of negotiating the cost/ profit target, and RIE itself.
The basic problem then is one of arriving at a sound standard
methodology for applying risk in some systematic fashion to the
design of the RIE and share function. The researcher has done
this by using a curve in place of a linear share function, where
the share ratio changes as a function of the cost variance.
The approach involves the application of two basic
statistical precepts, the Empirical Rule, and Variance. [Ref.
19] The researcher simply calculated the standard deviation by
taking the square root of the cost variance figure, such as the
one derived from the Worm method described in Chapter III. The
Empirical Rule states that in a normal distribution, 1 standard
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deviation plus or minus from the mean will cover 68% of probable
outcomes, 2 standard deviations 95% of outcomes, and 3 standard
deviations nearly all outcomes. (Fig. 4-3)
The researcher chose a range of two standard deviations from
the target as the RIE. In recalling the Beta method of
calculating the most likely target cost described in Chapter II,
the resultant value represents an approximation to the mean of the
distribution. It is important at this point to clarify two
issues in this respect. The research, as discussed in Chapter II,
suggests that the distribution of actual costs to target can be
generalized by the Beta distribution shown in Figure 3-1, as
opposed to the normal upon which the Empirical Rule is based.
However, the research generally supports the conclusion that this
situation stems from poor contract design and application of the
incentive, leading to inflated targets. The researcher feels
that proper contract application and design would signifiantly
reduce the difference between the modal and mean value as seen in
the research. By definition, target cost has equal probability
of being over or under run. This is actually a definition of the
median. In a normal distribution the mean median, and mode are
all equal. The researcher feels that the actual difference that
exists is acceptable for estimation purposes, and thus the
application of the Empirical Rule is a sound one. Furthermore,
the Worm method of calculating target and variance based upon the
Beta remains acceptable as well, since it also applies for a Beta
where r=N/2, a symmetrical distribution that includes the normal,
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Fig, 4-3 Normal Distribution
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as mentioned in Chapter III. A second issue is the researcher's
choice of a wider range for the RIE (95% of probable outcomes)
than is generally allowed by published guidance [Ref. 18: pp.
81-87]. The standard has been to restrict the range to the most
probable cost outcomes rather than a broader coverage. The
researcher feels however, that to make the incentive effective,
the RIE should have as wide a range as possible to provide for
maximum motivation. The range that the reseracher has
established also defines the low and high point of the RIE, where
the low cost point represents a profit ceiling and the high cost
point represents the PTA , with PTA equaling ceiling price.
Now that the RIE has been established, the share function is
calculated by modifying the linear profit equation as follows:




l 2 x SD J
lim TC + 2 x SD
where AC = Actual Cost TC = Target Cost
TP = Target Profit SD = Standard Deviation of Cost
The squared factor times Target Profit is added to Target
Profit for costs below target, and subtracted from Target Profit
for costs above target. The function results in a curve of
cost/profit points that reflect cost risk as a function of the
standard deviation of a probable cost outcome from the target.
The researcher has written a program in BASIC that calculates
the share curve based upon this formula, prints out specific
cost/profit points at intervals specified by the user, and
displays rough cost versus profit and price versus cost graphs
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for comparison purposes. Examples of program runs using cost
targets of differing variability, with differing target profits,
are shown in Appendix B.
As seen in the output, the share function yields a slow rate
of profit share changes about the target, with the rate of change
increasing as the standard deviation of the probable cost outcomes
increase. This provides for less contractor risk within a
reasonable range of target, with strong motivators for cost
control by increasing the rate at which the share is applied as
the cost deviation increases. As the RIE covers 95 % of the
probable cost outcomes, the share curve automatically adjusts to
the higher risk involved when the probable cost variance is
large. Well defined targets, with small associated variances,
will see tighter RIEs with share curves displaying steeper rates
of change. In the opposite case, the RIE will be wider, and the
rate of share change more gradual.
This method could have two important advantages in actual
practice
:
1. It is systematic and based upon acceptable statistical
parameters. It therefore removes a great deal of arbitrariness
and guesswork in establishing the RIE and the share function.
2. If accepted by the contractor, it could significantly
reduce the time spent in negotiation.
The primary disadvantages are that the method is complex, not
so much in computation, but in concept, and the increased risk




C. THE RELATIONSHIP OF TARGET PROFIT, CONTRACT PRICE, AND
COST VARIANCE
This application leaves one element left for negotiation, the
target profit. It is the only factor that is not systematically
calculated based upon statistical or risk based methodologies.
This is necessary since this input will largely determine the
strength of the incentive as reflected in the share curve. The
prime influences with which to provide positive motivation are:
the sharing or reduction of contractor risk, and the level of
profit as the reward for cost efficiency. As seen from the
research in Chapter II, indications are that often high target
profits, with low sharing rates and high cost ceilings, represent
an offset for expected overruns when target costs were perceived
as too risky. Notice that in the researcher's approach, target "
profit doubles at the minimum point and zeros out as the maximum
point of the RIE. Both of these extremes only occur at a
probability level of .05. Though some may take exception with
profit levels that have the possibility of doubling, the approach
here concentrates on final price to the government, and views
profit as a secondary consideration. To provide for effective
levels of motivation, the contractor must be able to attain high
profit levels for associated high levels of cost efficiency. If
we allow the contractor 10% of target cost as profit for example,
we must recognize that the capability of earning 20%, even though
the possibility of attaining it is low, would provide a strong
incentive. Even if that level is actually reached, the
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government would receive a bargain as far as final price compared
to target is concerned. The level of profit per se should not be
an overriding concern.
Upon a simple visual examination of Figure 4-4, where a
representative linear function is overlaid on its associated share
curve (i.e., as if it were fit by regression), it is easily seen
without integrating the respective functions that the area under
the curves are nearly equal. The implication here is that the
government would be exposing itself to little if any additional
cost exposure, over the total range of the function, by applying
the curved as opposed to a linear share design.
In order to fully understand the properties of the curvilinear
function however, two other relationships need to be studied. One
is the relationship of price to cost, and the other is the
relationship between profit and cost variance.
Since the profit/cost graph is automatically scaled to the
input parameters, all the output curves look the same, only the
scale and relevant values change. It is therefore much more
useful to view a price/cost graph to get a better view of what is
happening. In Appendix B, four price/cost graphs are shown using
a constant target cost figure of 500, and a base profit figure of
10%, while varying the standard deviation of cost at 5%, 8%, 10%,
and 20%. As can be observed from the graphs, the function
changes the price to cost relationship significantly as the cost
variance changes. Essentially, if we begin at a 0% standard
deviation of cost, the price/cost graph would be flat. At 5%, the
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g. 4-4 Area under Curves
Linear vs Curved Share Lines
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curve shows an S shaped bend from the flat line. It is interest-
ing to note in this case that target cost, and the maximum/
minimum points on the curve are all equal. It is certain that a
contractor would prefer a firm fixed price arrangement over this
sharing function at such low cost variances. The Q% cost
variance shows a continuing trend towards elongation of the S
shape, and also displays a contractual arrangement that nearly
turns into a firm fixed price arrangement past 1 standard
deviation of cost. The 10% graph continues the trend, flattening
out rapidly at the 1 standard deviation point. The final graph of
a 20*. standard deviation of cost simply stretches out the curve
more. From 1 0% on, no other significant changes occur, the graph
is merely stretched out with a more gradual slope, depicting a
contract price that increases at a decreasing rate as cost
increases
.
The researcher concludes that this observed trend would not
lend itself to actual application of the curved share function
much below a 10% standard deviation of cost. A contractor would
more likely prefer a firm fixed price arrangement rather than
accept the function's properties below that variance level.
Coincidentally , the break point conforms quite nicely with the
statement referred to earlier in this report by Mr. Roosin, that
contractors would like their estimates accurate to within 10% of
actuals. Given that management has this assurance, one could
expect firm fixed price contractual desires, as their risk is
relatively small. Beyond 10% of cost, risk of loss rises
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rapidly, principally because normal profit margins can more
readily be exhausted. The price/cost graph indicates that beyond
10%, the curve pattern does not change much, but increases at a
decreasing rate with cost. This provides for a high level of risk
sharing within 1 standard deviation above target, and strong
motivation for cost control at or beyond 1 standard deviation.
Recalling Figure 4-4, where a comparative linear share line
was overlaid on the curve, the areas under both curves would
actually only be equal if the PTA and the ceiling price were
equal. Though this does not occur in the standard FPIF design,
this is indeed the case over nearly all of the functional
applications of the research approach. In studying Table 4-1, a
matrix has been provided to compare different cost variances with
different profit levels. The cells are divided in half, with the
top portion showing the respective linear function as applied in
Figure 4-4, while the lower half of the cell shows where the PTA
falls. In nearly all cases, PTA equals ceiling price. The only
case where it does not are in those cases where there is high
profit applied to low cost variability, which would not actually
be seen in reality.
An interesting trend is noted on the diagonals of the matrix,
where the cost variance figures are equal to the profit levels.
In each case, the linear share comparison has a 50/50 split.
Furthermore, where cost variance is twice the profit percentage,
the associated linear sharing function is 75/25. In summary, the
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government portion of the share tends to increase as the variance
increases. When variance is held constant, the government linear
share comparison decreases as profit increases. This relationship
makes logical sense, however, it must be kept in mind that the
share curve does not really equate to these linear comparisons.
They are only the closest correlaries with which to compare the
curve's properties.
In fact, though the areas under the curves are equal across
both the linear and curved functions,, the widest difference occurs
at 1 standard deviation above and below the target. On the
underrun side, the government share is less than the linear
comparison, while on the overrun side it is more. The difference
of course rapidly approaches the linear comparison as it slopes
away from the 1 standard deviation point. What does this suggest?
The researcher concludes that the curve could immediately
benefit the government with the observed tendencies for inflated
targets and slight underruns, as the final cost would be less
than a comparative linear share on the underrun side. Of course,
this is based on the assumption that the curved function would be
used directly in place of the linear function as currently
applied. Since the curved function is developed primarily upon
the estimated cost variance, this is not likely to be the case.
In looking at the overall goals of the approach however, that of
strengthening the motivation for cost control by increasing the
profit possibilities while providing increased sharing of risks,
the function appears to achieve these goals.
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Risk for the contractor is greatest at 1 standard deviation of
cost, when cost variance is greater than the profit level. It is
at this point that losses occur. Recalling that 68% of all
outcomes in a normal distribution fall within plus or minus 1
standard deviation, this is where the likely outcomes will fall.
Beyond 1 standard deviation are the less likely outcomes. If the
contractor has prepared his estimates well, manages the contract
properly, and the government does not negatively impact the
process, then the outcome should be within 1 ^standard deviation.
Outside of this are those areas of extraordinary foul ups on the
overrun side, or extraordinary efforts at cost reduction or
increases productivity on the underrun side.
What is desired is some measure of increased cost sharing
where the contractor is most vulnerable. This would reduce
inflated targets and gaming to avoid loss, and thus provide a
better environment for the profit motive to take effect. On the
underrun side, the government should not provide much additional
profit for mediocre cost control, or for costs saved only because
targets were inflated. The government desires significant
improvements in cost control and increased productivity, and
should be ready to provide strong incentives to do so. The
researcher believes that close scrutiny of the curved share
approach will show that it indeed does this. The matrix shown in
Table 4-1 additionally implies that the government shares less in
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the risk at higher cost variances when the profit levels are also
high. This should provide much food for thought in comparing




The purpose of this research was to examine the incentive
contracting experience as illustrated by the literature base, and
integrate relevant cost risk analysis techniques into the design
of the incentive contract in a manner better reflecting the cost
risk involved. The focus centered on the linear share function,
contrasting it with an alternative method which applied a share
curve based on cost variance. The researcher feels that this
approach better reflects cost risk in the design of the incentive
and thus provide more motivational impact.
The primary research question was whether or not the standard
methods of incentive contact design, using linear share functions,
are optimal in motivating contractors to cost efficiency given
the respective cost risk involved. The researcher found that the
literature base strongly supported the conclusion that historic-
ally incentive contracts have been poorly designed and subject to
a great deal of gaming by contractors during negotiation. The
result has been impotent incentives, and a general dismissal by
the professional community of the past effectiveness of the
instrument as a whole. Thus the researcher concludes that though
standard methods appear not be optimal in effectively motivating
contractor cost performance, the fault may not entirely lie with
the concept of the linear share application, but with poor design
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and application of the instrument itself. However, even given
proper application of the standard cost incentive, after all
relevant data has been applied (i.e., contractor/commodity
research, proper validation of cost estimates, assessment of
current contracting environment, etc.), this researcher feels
that the design would still not be optimal. The linear share
function is a static design that does not change as risk changes
along the distribution of probable cost outcomes.
The subsidiary research questions involved cost risk
analysis, and its application to the share function. The
researcher concluded that the important factors to consider is
assessing the cost risk were:
- contractor characteristics such as overall financial health,
market position, and level of excess capacity.
- commodity characteristics such as stability of design,
quality of program definition, past quality of industry cost
estimates, and past history of the propensity for changes.
- environmental characteristics such as current budgetary,
market/economic, and regulatory pressures impacting the
contract
.
- validity of cost estimates judged by past experience, quality
and completeness of data, and level of disparity between
government and contractor estimates.
The question of how to quantify some of these factors
involved using techniques, such as the Worm method, that can be
used to systematically establish most likely cost values and
respective variances. The researcher chose the statistical
concept of variance to quantify risk through the application of
the standard deviation of cost from target. The share function
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was then bent into a curve by utilizing a formula that increased
the sharing rate as the standard deviation of cost from target
increased
.
The researcher believes that cost variance reflects risk in
that the larger the cost variance, the greater the cost risk.
Since the share curve adapts itself automatically as cost variance
increases or decreases, the researcher feels that it is a better
alternative than the linear approach in compensating for the
cost risk. Furthermore, the improvement in design should more
effectively motivate contractors towards cost efficiency.
The last point considered was that the share curve's
motivational effectiveness, perhaps even more than the standard
linear approach, depends heavily upon the target profit
negotiated. The researcher feels that too much emphasis is
placed on profit levels as a percentage of cost. The concern
should be on final cost to the government. Thus, though the
contractor could conceivably double his negotiated target profit
by extraordinary (.05 probability) cost efficiency, the cost
savings to the government would be worth the high reward. If
optimal motivation is to be achieved under this researcher's
approach, the contractor must not only be given the opportunity to
earn high profits when highly efficient performance in cost
control is achieved, but also have his "risk averse" tendencies
mitigated by greater risk sharing. Only then will the profit
motive operate to produce cost efficient behavior.
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APPENDIX A: THE WORM TECHNIQUE
10 DIM ft (8, 5) ,ETC(5)
£0 REM REAL MOR, MWR, MGOR
30 PRINT "THIS PROGRAM WAS WRITTEN TO PERFORM THE NECESSARY"
40 PRINT "CALCULATIONS FOR A RISK ANALYSIS BY GOERGE WORM, 1360"
50 PRINT "THE LINES REQUIRING THREE INPUTS END WITH L, ML, H"
60 PRINT
70 PRINT "MATERIAL COST L, ML, H"
80 INPUT ft (1,1), A(l,£), A (1,3)
90 PRINT
100 PRINT "MATERIAL OVERHEAD INDEPENDENT L, ML, H"
110 INPUT A(£,l), ft(£,£), A (£,3)
120 PRINT




170 PRINT "INTERDIVISIONAL TRANSFERS L, ML, H"
180 INPUT A(3,l), A(3,£), A(3,3)
190 PRINT
£00 PRINT "DIRECT ENGR LABOR (HOURS OR COST) L, ML, H"
£10 INPUT A(4,l), A(4,£), A(4,3)
££0 PRINT
£30 PRINT "ENGR WAGE RATE (ENTER 1 IF LABOR IS COST AND NOT HOURS)
£40 INPUT EWR
£50 PRINT
£60 PRINT "ENGR OVERHEAD INDEPENDENT L, ML, H"
£70 INPUT A(5,l), A(5,£), A(5,3)
£80 PRINT




330 PRINT "DIRECT MFG LABOR (HOURS OR COST) L, ML, H"
340 INPUT A(6,l), A(6,£), A(6,3)
350 PRINT
360 PRINT "MFG WAGE RATE (ENTER 1 IF LABOR IN COST AND NOT HOURS)"
370 INPUT MWR
380 PRINT
390 PRINT "MFG OVERHEAD INDEPENDENT L, ML, H"
400 INPUT A(7,l), A(7,£), A(7,3)
410 PRINT




460 PRINT "OTHER COSTS L, ML, H"
470 INPUT A(8,l), A(3,£), A(8,3)
480 PRINT





530 FOR 1=1 TG 8
540 A( I ,4)=(A( I , 1)+4*A( I,2)+ft(I,3) )/6
550 ft < 1 , 5 ) = ( ( A ( 1 ,3 > -fit 1 , 1 > ) /6 ) •"•£
560 NEXT I
570 FOR 1= 1 TO 4
580 ETC( I )=( 1+M0R)*A< 1 , I >+A<2 , I )+ft<3, I )+-EWR*( 1+E0R)*A(4, I)+fl(5,I)
590 ETC ( I ) =ETC ( I ) +MWR* ( 1 +MGOR ) *A < 6 , I ) +A < 7 , I ) +A < 8 , I
)
800 ETC( I )=ETC( I )*< 1+GAE)
610 NEXT I
620 ETC ( 5 ) = ( 1 +MOR ) "*2*fi (l,5)+fl<2,5)+fi(3,5)+< EWR+EWR*EOR
)
A2*fi (4,5)
630 ETC ( 5 ) =ETC ( 5 ) +A ( 5 , 5 ) + < MWR+MWR*MGOR ) * 2*A ( 6 , 5 ) +A ( 7 , 5 ) +A ( 8 , 5 )
640 TSL=ETC ( 4 ) +3*SQR < ETC ( 5 )
)
650 RATI0=3*SQR(ETC(5) )/ETC(4)
660 IF (RATIO > .05) GOTO 710




710 PRINT "SINCE VARIABILITY IS MORE THAN 5"/. FPIF IS RECOMMENDED)"
720 RATIO=RATIO*100
730 PRINT "EXPECTED TOTAL COST = " ; ETC ( 4
)
740 PRINT "INPUT WGM PROFIT (PERCENT)"
750 INPUT TP
760 TP=TP/100
770 PRINT "RISK ANALYSIS UPPER LIMIT = "; TSL
780 PRINT "INPUT COST RISK USED IN WGM (PERCENT)"
790 INPUT CR
800 CR=CR/100
810 PRINT TAB(20) "ESTIMATES FOR RISK ANALYSIS"
820 PRINT
830 PRINT
840 PRINT TAB(2) "ELEMENTS"
850 PRINT TAB (44) "MOST"
860 PRINT TAB (30) "MINIMUM LIKELY MAXIMUM"
670 PRINT
880 PRINT "MATERIAL", "COST" ,A( 1, 1 ) ,A( 1,2) ,A( 1,3)
890 PRINT "MGT OVERHEAD" ," INDEPENDENT " ; A (2 , 1 ) , A < 2,2) , A (2 ,3
)
900 PRINT " RATE FOR MATERIAL ";MOR
910 PRINT "INTERDIV TRANSFERS COST " , A ( 3 , 1 ) , A (3 ,2 ) , A (3 ,3)
920 PRINT "DIRECT ENGR LABOR HOURS ",A(4,1),A(4,2),A(4,3)
930 PRINT TAB (2) "WAGE RATE";" ";EWR
940 PRINT "ENGR OVERHEAD - INDEPENDENT " ; A( 5, 1 ) , A( 5 , 2 ) , A ( 5 , 3
)
950 PRINT TAB (2) "RATE FOR ENGR";" ";EOR
960 PRINT "DIRECT MFG LABOR HOURS " , A(6 , 1 ) , A ( 6 ,2) , A( 6 ,3
)
970 PRINT TAB (2) "WAGE RATE";" ";MWR
980 PRINT "MFG OVERHEAD - INDEPENDENT ";A(7,1),A(7,2),A(7,3)
990 PRINT TAB (2) "RATE FOR MFG";" ";MGOR
1000 PRINT "OTHER COST", "COST " , A( 8 , 1 ) , A ( 8 , 2 ) , A ( 8 , 3
)
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.000 PRINT "OTHER COST" , "COST " , A ( 8 , 1 ) , A ( 8 , £ ) , A ( 8 , 3
)
.010 PRINT "S&ft EXPENSE";" ";GAE
,0£0 PRINT
.030 PRINT TAB (£0) "SUMMARY, CEILING/SHARE COMPUTATION"
.040 PRINT
.050 PRINT
,060 PRINT "SUMMARY, MINIMUM COST" , ETC ( 1
)
.070 PRINT "SUMMARY, MOST LIKELY COST",ETC<£>
.080 PRINT "SUMMARY, MAXIMUM C0ST",ETC(3)
.090 PRINT "EXPECTED TOTAL COST, E ( TC )
"
, ETC ( 4 ) ; " EXCEEDED W/PRQB=.
100 PRINT "RISK ANALYSIS COST, RAC",TSL;" EXCEEDED W/PROB<.01
110 IF TP=0 GOTO 1300
ISO WP=TP-CR
130 WPD=TSL*WP
140 PRINT "WARRANTED PROF IT"TAB ( £9) ; WPD
150 TPD=TP*ETC<4)
160 PRINT "TARGET PROFIT"TAB( £9 ) ; TPD
170 CP=TSL+WPD
180 PRINT "CEILING PRICE"TAB ( £9 ) ;CP
190 PRINT
.£00 PRINT '"/.TAGE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RAC & OBJECTIVE" , RATIO.
.210 PRINT
.££0 PRINT "SHARING COMPUTATION"
.230 DUMM=TPD-WPD
.£40 PRINT "WGM PROFIT LESS WARRANTED PROFIT", DUMM
.£50 DUM=TSL-ETC(4)
.£60 PRINT "RISK ANALYSIS COST LESS OBJECTIVE COST",DUM
.£70 CS=DUMM/DUM*100
.£80 PRINT "CONTRACTORS SHARE" , CS ; '"/."
>90 PRINT
.300 PRINT "DO YOU WISH TO CHANGE WGM PROFIT OR RISK?"
.310 PRINT "(TYPE FOR YES, 1 FOR NO)"
3£0 INPUT ANS
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THIS PROGRAM WAS WRITTEN TO PERFORM THE NECESSARY
CALCULATIONS FOR A RISK ANALYSIS BY 3EORGE WORM, 1980
THE LINES REQUIRING THREE INPUTS END WITH L, ML, H
MATERIAL COST L, ML, H
? 11000, 15000,22000
MATERIAL OVERHEAD INDEPENDENT L, ML, H
? , ,
MATERIAL OVERHEAD RATE 7.
? 30
INTERDIVISIONAL TRANSFERS L, ML, H
? 50000,72000,100000
DIRECT ENGR LABOR (HOURS OR COST) L, ML, H
? 5000 , S200 , 7S00
ENGR WAGE RATE (ENTER 1 IF LABOR IS COST AND NOT HOURS)
ENGR OVERHEAD INDEPENDENT L, ML, H
? , ,
ENGR OVERHEAD RATE 7.
? SO
DIRECT MFG LABOR (HOURS OR COST) L, ML, H
? 20000 , 2S000 , 42000
MFG WAGE RATE (ENTER 1 IF LABOR IN COST AND NOT HOURS)
? 16
MFG OVERHEAD INDEPENDENT L, ML, H
? , ,
MFG OVERHEAD RATE 7.
? 150
OTHER COSTS L, ML, H
? 500,680,1100
S&A EXPENSE (PERCENT OF SUBTOTAL) 7.
? 50
SINCE VARIABILITY IS MORE THAN 57. FPIF IS RECOMMENDED)
EXPECTED TOTAL COST = 2253045
INPUT WGM PROFIT (PERCENT)
? 10
RISK ANALYSIS UPPER LIMIT = 2697286
INPUT COST RISK USED IN WGM (PERCENT)
? 4
79




RATE FOR MATERIAL .3
INTERDIV TRANSFERS COST
DIRECT ENGR LABOR HOURS
WAGE RATE 22
ENGR OVERHEAD - INDEPENDENT
RATE FOR ENGR .3
DIRECT MFG LABOR HOURS
WAGE RATE 16
MFG OVERHEAD - INDEPENDENT














500 680 1 1 00
SUMMARY, CEILING/SHARE COMPUTATION
SUMMARY, MINIMUM COST 1594200
SUMMARY, MOST LIKELY COST 2186550
SUMMARY, MAXIMUM COST 3177870
EXPECTED TOTAL COST, E ( TO 2253045 EXCEEDED W/PR0B=.5




/.TAGE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RAC & OBJECTIVE 19.71735
SHARING COMPUTATION
WGM PROFIT LESS WARRANTED PROFIT 63467.35
RISK ANALYSIS COST LESS OBJECTIVE COST 444240.8
CONTRACTORS SHARE 14.2867 7.
DO YOU WISH TO CHANGE WGM PROFIT OR RISK?




APPENDIX B: THE RESEARCH TECHNIQUE
10 CLS
20 CLS: KEY OFF
30 PRINT "THIS PROGRAM CALCULATES AN INCENTIVE SHARE CURVE BASED UPON THE"
40 PRINT "STANDARD DEVIATION OF TOTAL COST, THE COST TARGET, AND TARGET"
50 PRINT "PROFIT. WHEN PROMPTED FOR VALUES, ENTER VALUES IN THREE TO FOUR"
60 PRINT "SIGNIFICANTY DIGITS FOR BEST RESULTS. EXAMPLE : 450 FOR 450,000"
70 PRINT "500 FOR 500 MILLION, AND SO ON. WHEN SELECTING INTERVALS, CHOOSE"
80 PRINT "INTERVALS THAT WILL GENERATE AT LEAST 10 POINTS TO PRODUCE THE"
90 PRINT "SMOOTHEST CURVE."
100 PRINT
110 PRINT "TO RUN THE PROGRAM, PRESS 6"
120 INPUT RS
130 IF R$="G" THEN GOTO 140 ELSE IF R$="g" THEN GOTO 140 ELSE END
140 CLS
150 PRINT: PRINT: PR I NT: PRINT: PR I NT
160 INPUT "ENTER TARGET COST";TC
170 INPUT "ENTER TARGET PROFIT" ;TP
180 INPUT "ENTER STANDARD DEVIATION OF COST" ;SD
190 REM CALCULATE COST SWING
200 LRANGE=TC-(2*SD>
210 URANGE=TC+(2*SD)
220 INPUT "COST INTERVALS DESI RED" ; SCALE
230 CLS
240 REM NUMBER OF POINTS CALCULATED
250 GROUPS= ( URANGE-LRANGE ) /SCALE
260 REM GENERATE POINT CALCULATIONS
270 N=GR0UPS/2
280 DIM FACTOR ( 100)
290 DIM X(100):DIM Y(100):DIM Z(100)
300 DIM T*( 100)
310 FOR 1=1 TO N
320 PRINT
330 PRINT
340 FACTOR ( I ) = ( ( I *SCALE ) / ( 2*SD ) ) 'x2
350 NEXT I
360 PRINT "COST, PROFIT, AND PRICE POINTS"
370 PRINT
380 PRINT "COST" , "PROFIT", , "PRICE"
390 FOR I=N TO 1 STEP -1
400 PROFIT = TP+( FACTOR ( I ) *TP
)
410 COST=TC-(I*SCALE)
420 PRICE = COST + PROFIT
430 IF FACT0R(I)=1 THEN PRINT COST , PROFIT, , PRICE: X ( I )=COST : Y< I )=PROFIT: Z ( I )=PRIC
E-.GOTO 460
4^0 PRINT COST, PROFIT, , PRICE
450 X(I)=COST:Y(I)=PROFIT:Z( I)=PRICE
460 NEXT I
470 PRINT TC,TP, "TARGET" , TC+TP
480 X ( N+ 1 ) =TC : Y ( N+ 1 ) =TP : Z ( N+ 1 ) =TC+TP
490 FOR 1=1 TO N
500 PROFIT = TP-(FACTOR(I)*TP)
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510 CCST=TC+< I*SCPLE>
520 PRICE = COST + PROFIT
530 PRINT COST, PROFIT, , PRICE
540 X ( I+N+l )=COST:Y( I+N+l ) =PROFIT : Z ( I+N+l )=PRICE
550 NEXT I
560 PRINT






630 PRINT "TO SEE GRAPH OF PROFIT VS COST, PRESS G": INPUT G$
640 IF G*="G" THEN GOTO 650 ELSE IF G$="g" THEN GOTO 650 ELSE GOTO 1410






710 LINE (XO, 10)-(X0, 140)
720 LOCATE 19,4: PRINT XI
730 LOCATE 19,75: PRINT X£
740 IF GRAPH$="PRICE" THEN Y1=TC
750 IF GRAPH*="PRICE" AND SD/TO . 1 THEN Y1=Z(N)




800 IF GRAPH$="PRICE" THEN W=Z < GROUPS+1 ) +TP
810 IF GRAPH*="PRICE" AND SD/TO . 1 THEN W=Z ( GROUPS+l
)
820 LOCATE 2,1: PR I NT W
830 GX=SD:GY=10
840 IF SD/TO. 1 THEN GY=20
850 Y=YO-GY*SY
860 IF Y<10 GOTO 900




910 IF YM40 GOTO 950




960 IF X<35 GOTO 1000




1010 IF X>625 GOTO 1050





1070 FOR 1=1 TO (PT+1)
1080 A=XO+(X< I >-Xl )*SX
1090 IF GRflPH*="PRICE" THEN Y ( I )=Z ( I )-Z (N)
1100 B=YO-Y(I)*SY
1110 LINE (A-1,B-1)-(A-1,B+1 ) :LINE ( A, B-l )- ( ft, B+l ) : LINE ( ft+1
,
B-l ) - ( ft+1 ,B+1 )
1120 NEXT I
1130 FOR J=l TO (PT+1) :T*( J)="N" :NEXT J
1140 ft=+999999!
1150 XS=-99999!
1160 FOR J=l TO (PT+1)





1220 IF NCXPT+1) GOTO 1370
1230 ft=+999999l
1240 FOR J=l TO (PT+1)
1250 IF J=P1 GOTO 1£70
1260 IF X(J)>=X(P1) AND X(JXfl AND T*(J)="N" THEN A=X(J):P2=J
1270 NEXT J









1370 IF GRftPH*="PRICE" THEN GOTO 1380 ELSE GOTO 1390
1380 LOCATE 21,35:PRINT "PRICE VS COST":GOTO 1A70
1390 LOCATE 21,32: PRINT "INCENTIVE SHARE CURVE" : LOCATE 22,35:PRINT "PROFIT VS C
0ST":PR=1
1400 IF GRAPH*="PRICE" AND PR=1 THEN GOTO 1470
1410 PRINT "TO SEE GRAPH OF PRICE VS COST PRESS G" : INPUT G*
1420 IF G*="G" THEN GOTO 1440 ELSE GOTO 1430
1430 IF G*="g" THEN GOTO 1440 ELSE GOTO 1470
1440 GRAPH*="PRICE"
1450 IF SD/TO.l THEN Y2-Z ( GROUPS+1 )-TC+SD: GOTO 650
1460 Y2=Z (GROUPS+1 )-TC+TP:GOTO 650
1470 PRINT "TO RUN THE PROGRAM AGAIN, PRESS G"
1480 INPUT R*
1490 IF R$="G" GOTO 1500 ELSE IF R$="g" THEN GOTO 1500 ELSE GOTO 1510
1500 CLEAR -.GOTO 140
1510 END
? RUN
ThI3 PROGRAM CALCULATES AN INCENTIVE SHARE CURVE BASED UPON THE
STANDARD DEVIATION OF TOTAL COST, THE COST TARGET, AND TARGET
PROFIT. WHEN PROMPTED FOR VALUES, ENTER VALUES IN THREE TO FOUR
SIGNIFICANTY DIGITS FOR BEST RESULTS. EXAMPLE : 450 FOR 450,000
500 FOR 500 MILLION, AND SO ON. WHEN SELECTING INTERVALS, CHOOSE
INTERVALS THAT WILL GENERATE AT LEAST 10 POINTS TO PRODUCE THE
SMOOTHEST CURVE.
TO RUN THE PROGRAM, PRESS G
? G
ENTER TARGET COST? 500
ENTER TARGET PROFIT? 50
ENTER STANDARD DEVIATION OF COST? 100
COST INTERVALS DESIRED? 10
84











65.125 4 .jo . 1 i=l5
6c! . 5 462.5
60.125 470.125
56 478
56 . i ii5 466. 125
54.5 494 .
5
j«3 1 C-—J 503. 125
c-.Jll 512
51.125 521 . 125
50.5 530 .
50. 125 540. 125
50 TARGET 550
49.875 559 . 875
49.5 569.5






39 . 875 629 . 875
637.5





























































ENTER TARGET COST? 700
ENTER TARGET PROFIT^ 42
ENTER STANDARD DEVIATION OF COST^ 50
COST INTERVALS DESIRED^' 10
COST, PROFIT, AND PRICE POINTS
COST PROFIT
600 84
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